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International Conflicts In Child Custody:
United States v. Saudi Arabia
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of child custody confronts many divorcing couples
with children. When the parents' nationalities differ, the wishes of
one to return to his or her own country exacerbates the problem. One
parent then faces the probability of never or only rarely seeing the
child again. This type of situation increases the importance of an ac-
tual custody decree, spelling out the rights and obligations of each
parent. Even when the custody laws of the two countries are similar,
each parent usually anticipates a more favorable decree from his or
her own country. But when the laws of the two countries vary widely,
the custody decision may openly discriminate against one parent.
This Comment compares the widely divergent systems of child
custody law of the United States and Saudi Arabia. The discussion
focuses only on the major issues involved, including findings on the
criteria used for custody in both countries and the recognition of for-
eign custody judgments by the United States. The findings are then
applied to a specific set of facts.' Finally, this Comment presents a
proposal for dealing with this type of case.
2
II. ISLAMIC LAW OF SAUDI ARABIA
The shari'a, the divine law of Islam, stems from several sources:
the word of God in the Quran, the law given to Islam by the Prophet
Muhammad, known as the sunna, and the law formed by the consen-
sus of scholars in the community, known as the ijma'.3 "The word
shari'a literally means 'the path to follow' and it is the name given to
1. See infra notes 173-78 and accompanying text.
2. Although collateral issues such as the validity of an Islamic talaq divorce in the
United States and international child abduction are touched upon, they are not explored in
depth. Nor are child support or visitation rights discussed.
The analysis is written from the point of view of a United States woman who has returned
from Saudi Arabia with her child, because the conflict would most likely not arise if a United
States man were involved. Given the built-in bias of the traditional Islamic legal system, men
receive deferential treatment. This Comment does not intend to suggest that women are inher-
ently better caretakers than men; any of the arguments herein stated are equally applicable to
men who have been discriminated against in another country's application of child custody
law.
3. Yamani, The Eternal Shari'a, 12 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 206-07 (1979).
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the all-embracing legal system that regulates the lives of Muslims
everywhere."' 4 As a traditional Islamic country, Saudi Arabia con-
strues the shari'a narrowly, obligating every Muslim to follow the
binding authority of the shari'a. The shari'a does not simply govern
religious thought and devotions, it applies to all things in everyday life
as the foundation of life for all Muslims.
6
The four historical Sunni schools of Islamic judicial thought still
remain as the main vehicles for contemporary interpretation of Is-
lamic law. 7 These schools are the Shafi'i, Hanafi, Hanbali and
Maliki.8 Although the schools resemble one another in their use of
analogy and community consensus as methods of interpretation, they
differ as to how much discretion a judge has in using personal inter-
pretation. 9 The Hanbali school, the most conservative of the four,
governs Saudi Arabia.10 The King's declarations and those of his ap-
pointed ministers supplement the Hanbali school's pronouncements. "
The Hanbali school's view that public interest plays a large part in the
interpretation of the shari'a distinguishes it from the other Sunni
schools. 12 The Hanbali jurist searches for the particular public inter-
est involved in the case, balancing that interest against the welfare of
the individual in the community in this life and in the next.
13
The shari'a court system in Saudi Arabia consists of two lower
courts and two Courts of Appeal. 14 The Supreme Judicial Council
oversees those courts and also oversees the Ministry of Justice. 15 Ad-
ditional semi-judicial courts enforce the regulations set out by the
King and his ministers. 16 The morals or religious police, enforce
4. Id.
5. Id. at 206.
6. Asherman, Doing Business in Saudi Arabia: The Contemporary Application of Islamic
Law, 16 INT'L LAW. 321, 322-25 (1978).
7. Glauber, Religious Law in Changing Societies: Interpreting Islamic and Jewish Law,
12 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 201 (1979).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Comment, Islamic Law and Modern Government: Saudi Arabia Supplements the
Shari'a to Regulate Development, COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 413, 421-22 (1979).
11. 2 A. PEASLEE, CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS 1090 (rev. 3d ed. 1966).
12. Yamani, supra note 3, at 208.
13. Id. This appears to be similar to the way in which a United States judge balances
common law interests, but the United States judge would not consider the after-life. In fact,
the First Amendment prohibits it.
14. Comment, supra note 10, at 440.
15. Id. at 441.
16. Asherman, supra note 6, at 328. As these regulations are given by man and not God,
they are not considered law, but only lesser proclamations. Comment, supra note 10, at 438.
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those laws relating to religious devotions, such as matters of custom
and dress for women. 17 Due to these overlapping systems, and be-
cause of the oral tradition of Saudi Arabian law, black-letter law prac-
tically eludes determination."' A court in a foreign country could
encounter great difficulty applying Saudi law in many contexts. But
because Saudi Arabian family law has escaped modern reform, 19 a
foreign court could readily ascertain what law to apply in a family law
context.
A. Islamic Family Law
Saudi Arabia adheres to the classical Islamic family law,20 which,
compared to other areas of law, has remained unaffected by modem
Western legal codes.21 Although some Islamic countries have at-
tempted to reform the general area of family law,22 the laws regarding
child custody remain essentially unchanged. Unlike the United
States, an Islamic divorce does not contain a child custody
determination.
Saudi Arabia recognizes three kinds of divorce. Talaq divorce,
the first and most traditional kind, consists of a repudiation of the
wife by her husband when he says "I divorce thee" three times.23 He
may pronounce one talaq and then wait three months to pronounce
the other two, or he may pronounce one talaq each month for three
months before the divorce becomes final. 24 In this way, the husband
has a chance to reconsider before he actually divorces his wife. 25 An-
other form of talaq divorce occurs when the husband says all three
talaqs at the same time, thus ending the marriage immediately.
26
17. R. NYROP, AREA HANDBOOK FOR SAUDI ARABIA 125 (3d ed. 1977).
18. Asherman, supra note 6, at 322-25.
19. "[T]here are a number of countries in which there has been no effort to reform or
codify traditional law as it applies to women and the family .... Saudi Arabia ... [is] among
the nations which up to 1972 had not reformed or codified any aspect of personal or family
law." White, Legal Reform as an Indicator of Women's Status in Muslim Nations, in WOMEN
IN THE MUSLIM WORLD 54 (L. Beck & N. Keddie eds. 1978).
20. T. MAHMOOD, FAMILY LAW REFORM IN THE MUSLIM WORLD 3 (1972).
21. J. ESPOSITO, WOMEN IN MUSLIM FAMILY LAW x (1982); Gottheil, Introductory
Note, in A. SHUKRI, MUHAMMEDAN LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE (1966).
22. See generally J. ESPOSITO, supra note 21; White, supra note 19, at 54-61.
23. A. SHUKRI, supra note 21, at 94.
24. Coulson & Hinchcliffe, Women and Law Reform in Contemporary Islam, in WOMEN
IN THE MUSLIM WORLD, supra note 19, at 42-43.
25. Id. at 43.
26. Id.
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Most Muslims frown upon this type of talaq, but accept it as legal. 27
In fact, Muslim men use this form more than any other.2 It not only
irrevocably dissolves the marriage, it also makes remarriage between
the parties illegal until the woman has married another man, consum-
mated that marriage, and divorced again.
29
With the second kind of divorce, the kuhl divorce, the parties
mutually agree to divorce.30 With the third and most modem kind of
divorce, one party obtains a divorce by judicial decree. 3' Although
either party can obtain a judicial divorce, usually the wife seeks one
because, unlike traditional divorce, women are given the power to
unilaterally divorce their husbands. 32 This judicial form gives the
wives a power they formerly did not have under the talaq form. 33 Yet
a woman would be unlikely to seek a judicial divorce without the sup-
port and encouragement of the men on her side of the family, 34 which
is not always given. 35 None of these types of divorce contains a sepa-
rate child custody decree. Neither does the type of divorce affect
what custody laws the Islamic system applies.
A foreordained set of laws, which Muslims follow as much by
religious custom as by legal enforcement, determines custody. Rigid-
ity characterizes the traditional Islamic law relating to child cus-
tody. 36 Every Sunni school agrees that a divorced or widowed mother
has custody of her children for a limited period of time. 37 The time
period differs from school to school. In Saudi Arabia, Hanbali law
dictates that a divorced mother has the right to custody of her son
until he reaches seven years of age.38 The father takes custody of the
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See generally A. SHUKRI, supra note 21.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Fernea & Bezirgan, Introduction, in MIDDLE EASTERN MUSLIM WOMEN SPEAK
xxiv (1977).
35. Id.
In Marrakech in 1972, for example, the family of a deserted wife was unwilling
to take legal steps against the missing husband because he was a first cousin, and
such public proceedings as a law case were seen as bad for the reputation of the entire
family. This (the reputation of the group) was a more important consideration than
the plight of a single member of the group, in this case the deserted wife.
Id.
36. Coulson & Hinchcliffe, supra note 24, at 44.
37. Id. at 44-45.
38. J. ESPOSITO, supra note 21, at 37; see also M. KHAN BAHADUR, II TAGORE LAW
[Vol. 9:413416
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boy at age seven based upon the traditional Islamic ideal that a boy no
longer needs the assistance of women after that age. 39 By that age he
should be able to dress himself, feed himself and know basic hy-
giene.40 The father then takes charge to ensure the boy's proper reli-
gious upbringing. The divorced mother also has custody of her
daughter until she reaches nine years of age or puberty, whichever
comes first.41 The father obtains physical custody of his daughter at
age nine or upon puberty because she has then reached the age of
carnal desire.42 Traditionally, her father can better supervise her at
that age than her mother.43 When the child reaches the predeter-
mined age, the father or his nearest male relative takes physical
custody. 4
Even while the mother has physical custody of the child, Islamic
law considers the father the child's legal guardian. 45 He has responsi-
bility for the child's education and maintenance.46 He can also con-
tract the child's marriage without the mother's consent.47 The
mother can also lose custody simply by marrying a man not related to
the child within a proscribed degree or if she becomes physically or
morally unfit.48 Saudi Arabia steadfastly adheres to these traditional
laws.
4 9
LECTURES 1891-92, MAHOMEDAN LAW RELATING TO MARRIAGE, DOWER, DIVORCE, LE-
GITIMACY, AND GUARDIANSHIP OF MINORS, ACCORDING TO THE SOONEES §§ 1551, 1542
(1898) [hereinafter TAGORE LECTURES].
39. TAGORE LECTURES, supra note 38, § 1551.
40. Id.
41. Id.; see also J. ESPOSITO, supra note 21, at 37.
42. TAGORE LECTURES, supra note 38, § 1551.
43. Id.
44. Id.; see also J. ESPOSITO, supra note 21, at 37.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Coulson & Hinchcliffe, supra note 24, at 45.
48. Id.
49. J. ESPOSITO, supra note 21, at 56. In 1919, Egypt changed the ages at which a
mother must relinquish custody of her children to nine for boys and eleven for girls. The
rationale remained the same. In 1979, Egypt raised the ages again so that a boy would be
relinquished at ten and a girl at twelve. The most important change, however, was that the
judge was given the discretion to consider the best interests of the children. Using these crite-
ria, the mother could conceivably be allowed to retain custody until her daughter married and
until her son reached fifteen, the age of manhood. Id. at 62.
Today, throughout the greater part of the Muslim world, these traditional rules re-
garding custody of children have been relaxed. The principle underlying the recent
reforms has been that the welfare of the child is paramount.... Sudanese law allows
the court a similar discretion [similar to the discretion given the Egyptian court] up
to the age of puberty in the case of boys and until marriage in the case of girls. The
law in Syria, Tunisia, Iraq, Iran, and South Yemen now expressly provides that the
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If one spouse renounces Islam or follows a non-Muslim faith,
then the law regarding custody weighs heavily in favor of the Islamic
spouse. If a spouse renounces Islam, the law still considers the minor
children as Muslim.50 If a danger exists that the child will become a
non-Muslim, the Muslim spouse will retain custody despite the child's
age.5' Islamic law presumes that it serves the child's best interests to
bring up the child in a healthy religous atmosphere. 52 Since Islam is
considered to be the "best" religion, the Muslim spouse should have
custody.53
The shari'a also states that if the child does not reside in a Mus-
lim country at age seven, he or she may choose which religion to fol-
low. 54 The perceived danger of the child becoming non-Muslim thus
appears very real if the non-Muslim spouse removes the child from
Saudi Arabia to a non-Muslim country. The choice of religion is the
child's right, even though his father controls his religous education.55
As long as the child has an understanding of the consequences of his
act, he decides as a personal matter of conscience. 56 Even more im-
portant, however, a child automatically abandons allegiance to the
Islamic faith if he is unable to state the tenets of Islam upon reaching
the age of majority. 57 Saudi Arabia bases its government largely on
the premise that it will uphold the Islamic faith. 58 It therefore has a
high public interest in maintaining laws by which a Muslim spouse
takes physical custody of children at a young age.
interests of the child are of prime importance, and custody may be granted to either
parent at the court's discretion. In India and Pakistan the same results have been
achieved by means of judicial decisions. The principle that emerges from the case
law is that the welfare of the child is paramount, and although there is a presumption
that the welfare of the child is best served by applying the strict rules of the tradi-
tional law, the presumption is rebuttable.
Coulson & Hinchcliffe, supra note 24, at 45.
50. K. AHMED, THE MUSLIM LAW OF DIVORCE 810, 811 (1972).
51. Id. at 528, 812.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 810; see III TAGORE LECTURES, supra note 38, § 2805.
55. K. AHMED, supra note 50, at 810.
56. Id. at 810-11.
57. III TAGORE LECTURES, supra note 38, § 2806.
58. Comment, supra note 10, at 423-24. "The investiture of the King is a form of con-
tract between the ruler and the peole [sic]. The King promises to govern in accordance with
the shari'a and Islamic tradition. If he were to violate this oath, he could legally be deposed."
Id. at 429 (footnotes omitted).
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B. Bias in the Islamic Legal System
The traditional Islamic legal system contains an inherent bias
against women. Before the pronouncement of the Quran, the custom-
ary and tribal laws of the Middle East exhibited this bias.59 While
some contradictions between customary law and the Quran existed,
60
the two systems shared a basic premise, man's superiority over wo-
man.61 Islam's individuality arises in how it dictates women's status
by its religious law, especially the Quran.62 As a result, the Islamic
system enshrines the inferior status of women at the heart of the reli-
gion.63 Therefore, innovators find more difficulty in changing wo-
men's status than if it were defined only by custom. 64
This bias appears in the everyday restrictions placed upon wo-
men. Islamic law does not allow women to travel alone, 65 leave the
house unveiled, 66 work with men,67 or even occupy the same room as
a male non-relative.68 The Quran mandates the obedience of women
to men, legitimizes a man's marrying up to four wives at the same
time,69 and dictates that a man inherit twice what a woman does.
70
Under the Quran, women have male guardians, have less reason than
men, and the testimony of two women equals that of one man.71 But
59. Fernea & Bezirgan, supra note 34, at xviii - xx; Beck & Keddie, Introduction, in
WOMEN IN THE MUSLIM WORLD, supra note 19, at 25.
60. Fernea & Bezirgan, supra note 34, at xix. For example, "[t]he Koran's acceptance of
human sexuality as a good to be enjoyed by both men and women, on earth and in paradise, is
opposed by a male [customary] view that female sexual drives are dangerous and in need of
curbing." Id.
61. Id.
62. Beck & Keddie, Introduction, in WOMEN IN THE MUSLIM WORLD, supra note 19, at
25.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. D. PIPES, IN THE PATH OF GOD: ISLAM AND POLITICAL POWER 24 (1983).
66. Fernea & Bezirgan, supra note 34, at xxv.
67. D. PIPES, supra note 65, at 24.
68. La Jolla Light, Sept. 27, 1984, at BI, col. 2.
69. Beck & Keddie, Introduction, in WOMEN IN THE MUSLIM WORLD, supra note 19, at
25.
70. Id.; see also QUR'AN sura (chapter) iv, verse I (A. Yusuf Ali trans. 1946).
71. QUR'AN sura ii, verse 282 (A. Yusuf Ali trans. 1946); Beck & Keddie, Introduction,
in WOMEN IN THE MUSLIM WORLD, supra note 19, at 25-26.
"And what about women?" I asked. "Ah," he said with a smile, "women are quite
another matter. You see, women too have 'aquel' [reason], but in their case it can't
develop as much as in men. It's just in their nature. Women have very great sexual
desires and that's why a man is always necessary to control them, to keep them from
creating all sorts of disorder, to keep them from leading men astray. Why else do we
call women hbel shitan (the Rope of Satan)? That is why women must be cloaked
when in public, live in houses with small windows placed so that others cannot see in,
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. J.
not all of the restrictions on women directly issue from the Quran.
The hallmark of early Muslim jurisprudence, or at least the juris-
prudence of the Sunni majority, was the principle that the status
quo remained valid unless and until it was expressly superseded by
the dictates of Islam. Hence the standards and the criteria of pre-
Islamic customary law were carried over into Islam and exercised a
dominant influence in the development of the Islamic legal
system.
72
Thus, customs still exist involving man's superiority over woman that
the Quran does not directly embody, but may still be upheld in
court.
73
In Saudi Arabia, the traditional attitudes towards women as out-
lined above still prevail. 74 In addition to the above restrictions, since
men and women cannot stay in the same room together, girls are edu-
cated in separate schools after the age of six.75 Girls must wear the
veil after they reach eleven or twelve. 76 At the university level, female
students watch lectures on closed circuit television to maintain com-
plete segregation from male students and male professors. 77 They
must use a telephone in their classroom to ask the professor any ques-
tions.78 One day a week the library bars male students so the female
students may use it.79 Moving to the world outside the class room,
women are not allowed to drive cars.80 Thus, Saudi life abounds with
restrictions on women which would be considered prejudicial in most
Western countries.
The bias of concern here is the Saudi Arabian law's presumption
that the father can best care for a child of either sex after a predeter-
mined age.8' A Saudi court will not do a balancing test to determine
and married off before they can give their fathers any trouble. It's like the saying
goes: 'A woman by herself is like a Turkish bath without water,' because she is
always hot and without a man she has no way to slake the fire."
Rosen, The Negotiation of Reality: Male-Female Relations in Sefrou, Morrocco, in WOMEN IN
THE MUSLIM WORLD, supra note 19, at 568.
72. Coulson & Hinchcliffe, supra note 24, at 38.
73. Beck & Keddie, Introduction, in WOMEN IN THE MUSLIM WORLD, supra note 19, at
26.
74. Nath, Education and Employment among Kuwaiti Women, in WOMEN IN THE MUS-
LIM WORLD, supra note 19, at 177.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. II TAGORE LECTURES, supra note 38, § 1551.
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the relative merits of the parents. If a woman approached a court to
obtain permanent custody, the court would still award custody to the
Islamic man.82 If the father has died, or has some moral or physical
disability, his nearest male relative will receive custody. 83 Therefore,
Islamic law's bias against a woman's right to have permanent custody
predetermines the result of any custody proceeding in Saudi Arabia.
III. CHILD CUSTODY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
State court jurisdiction over child custody suits has a long estab-
lished tradition. 84 The federal courts have refused to take jurisdiction
over custody cases because courts at the state court level could best
handle domestic matters. 85 As in many areas of law, this refusal re-
sulted in significant variations in custody laws among various states.
86
These variations caused severe problems in enforcing one state's cus-
tody decree in another state. Because a custody decree can change,
most states did not consider it a final judgement.8 7 Therefore, a cus-
tody decree did not deserve full faith and credit under article IV § 1 of
the United States Constitution,88 and another state could fashion a
new custody decree using its own criteria. However, in the last two
decades the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA)8 9 has
reformed jurisdiction and modification requirements.
In addition to changes in jurisidictional law, a shift in emphasis
has occured regarding the criteria determining child custody from a
sex-based presumption of fitness to a "best interests" analysis. The
criteria used to determine the best interests of the child vary from
state to state. Most states have at least some statutory guidelines
where the legislature has specified which criteria are paramount in the
"best interests" analysis.90 Other state statutes only indicate that the
82. See supra notes 36-49 and accompanying text.
83. J. ESPOSITO, supra note 21, at 37.
84. A. HARALAMBIE, HANDLING CHILD CUSTODY CASES § 9.01 (Family Law Series
1983).
85. Schleiffer v. Meyers, 644 F.2d 656 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 82 (1981).
86. A. HARALAMBIE, supra note 84, § 9.01.
87. Id.
88. Id. Full faith and credit does not apply to custody orders "since they must always
remain non-final if custody allocation is going to be based on the current best interest of a
child." R. CROUCH, INTERSTATE CUSTODY LITIGATION: A GUIDE TO USE AND COURT
INTERPRETATION OF THE UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT xi (1981).
89. 9 U.L.A. 111-70 (1979).
90. For a general survey of specific state statutes dealing with the UCCJA and the best
interests analysis, see 2 CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION LAW AND PRACTICE 10A-I to
IOA-14 (1986).
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"best interests" of the child controls custody, allowing the individual
judge to decide what specific factors to use. 91 In that instance, the
judge looks to the case law of his state to determine the applicable
factors.
A. The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws developed the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
(UCCJA) in 1968.92 The UCCJA attempts to eliminate forum-shop-
ping for custody disputes and encourages cooperation between differ-
ent state courts. 93 It established specific guidelines for a state court's
jurisdiction over a custody dispute, 94 and for enforcement of another
state's custody decree. 95 The UCCJA also delineates which criteria a
state court, other than the court of original jurisdiction, must meet in
order to assume jurisdiction and to modify the original court's cus-
tody decree. 96 The UCCJA contains a section that specifically refers
to international application. 97
All fifty states and the District of Columbia have adopted the
UCCJA,9 8 although some states have made omissions, modifications
or additions. 99 Because the UCCJA now applies in all states, it would
apply to any action brought in the United States for an initial custody
decree or for the enforcement or modification of a foreign country's
decree.
[A] court will first determine from the parties' representations and
from communication with other states' judges whether it has juris-
diction, and then will determine on the basis of the same evidence,
or more if necessary, whether it is appropriate to exercise that ju-
risdiction. Then and only then will [the court] address the merits
of the custody claim.l°°
91. Id.
92. P. HOFF, CHILD CUSTODY PROJECT, INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL CHILD
CUSTODY DISPUTES 1 (1981).
93. Id.; Marcus, Recognition, Enforcement and Modification Under UCCJA and PKPA;
Comity and Full Faith and Credit, in 2 CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION LAW AND PRAC-
TICE § 5.02 (1986).
94. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 3, 9 U.L.A. 122 (1979).
95. Id. § 15, 9 U.L.A. 158 (1979).
96. Id. § 14, 9 U.L.A. 153 (1979).
97. Id. § 23, 9 U.L.A. 167 (1979).
98. Marcus, supra note 93, § 5.02.
99. A. HARALAMBIE, supra note 84, § 9.01.
100. R. CROUCH, supra note 88, at xiv. For a good guide to practicing under the UCCJA,
see id. This book contains the text of the UCCJA, the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act
422 [Vol. 9:413
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The UCCJA creates a certainty about what law another state will ap-
ply and also allows a court to draw upon a body of interpretive case
law from other states regarding jurisdiction.'l0
1. Section 3 (jurisdiction)
Section 3102 of the UCCJA sets out the jurisdictional require-
ments that the parties in a child custody case must meet which entitle
a particular state court to exercise jurisdiction. This section covers
jurisdiction over both initial decrees and modifications. The UCCJA
acts in conjunction with the jurisdictional requirements of the federal
and the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. This
source also has the text of the Strasbourg Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of
Decisions Concerning Custody of Children and on Restoration of Custody of Children.
Although this latter Convention cannot be used directly, as the United States is not and cannot
be a signatory, it could be helpful when the Hague Convention is ratified if both Conventions
are used in conjunction. The United States cannot sign the Strasbourg Convention as member-
ship in the Council of Europe, limited to European Countries, is required. The Strasbourg
Convention could be used to retrieve children from countries who are members of the Council
of Europe but are not signatories of the Hague Convention when the child has been taken
through a country that is a signatory of both conventions. Id. at 97.
101. Id. at 1.
102. Section 3 of the U.C.C.J.A. reads:
(a) A court of this State which is competent to decide child custody matters
has jurisdiction to make a child custody determination by initial or modification de-
cree if:
(1) this State (i) is the home state of the child at the time of commencement of
the proceeding, or (ii) had been the child's home state within 6 months before com-
mencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this State because of his
removal or retention by a person claiming his custody or for other reasons and a
parent or person acting as parent continues to live in this State; or
(2) it is in the best interest of the child that a court of this State assume juris-
diction because (i) the child and his parents, or the child and at least one contestant,
have a significant connection with this State, and (ii) there is available in this State
substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care, protection, train-
ing, and personal relationships; or
(3) the child is physically present in this State and (i) the child has been aban-
doned or (ii) it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because he has been
subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse or is otherwise neglected [or
dependent]; or
(4) (i) it appears that no other state would have jurisdiction under prerequi-
sites substantially in accordance with paragraphs (1), (2), or (3), or another state has
declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this State is the more appropriate
forum to determine the custody of the child, and (ii) it is in the best interest of the
child that this court assume jurisdiction.
(b) Except under paragraphs (3) and (4) of subsection (a), physical presence in
this State of the child, or of the child and one of the contestants, is not alone suffi-
cient to confer jurisdiction on a court of this State to make a child custody determi-
nation.
(c) Physical presence of the child, while desirable, is not a prerequisite for ju-
risdiction to determine his custody.
UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 3, 9 U.L.A. 122-23 (1979).
424 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. J. [Vol. 9:413
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), which provides a fed-
eral mandate for interstate enforcement of custody decrees. 03 The
UCCJA lists four bases for jurisdiction in preferential order: home
state, significant connection, emergency and no other state has
jurisdiction. lO4
The most preferred basis for jurisdiction occurs when the state in
which the court sits qualifies as the child's home state. 05 The
UCCJA defines the state as (1) the state where the child resides at the
beginning of the custody proceedings, 10 6 or (2) as the state where one
parent resides if the child lived in that state within six months before
the proceeding. 10 7 The parent within the state does not necessarily
initiate the custody proceeding, the parent may live outside the state
which qualifies as the home state. If the child has not reached the age
of six months, the home state is where the child has lived since birth
with any person attempting to gain or retain custody in the suit.108
Second in preference, a court maintains jurisdiction over the suit
when the child and at least one parent have a "significant connection"
with the state. The significant connection test requires a showing that
"substantial evidence" exists in that state regarding the child's care,
relationships, training and protection. 10 9 This language would appear
to lend itself to a very broad interpretation, allowing more than one
state to exercise jurisdiction. However, the Commissioners' Com-
ment to Section 1 specifically dictates an interpretation of Section 3 in
103. Pub. L. No. 96-611, 94 Stat. 3566 (1980). The PKPA:
embodies the same purposes as the UCCJA, and § 8 had the effect of requiring all
states, whether or not they have enacted the UCCJA, to enforce and refuse to modify
decrees and custody orders of other states which were rendered in conformity with
the federal requirements .... The [PKPA] states a clear preference for home state
jurisdiction by making enforcement of foreign custody orders mandatory only when
rendered by a court with home state jurisdiction.
A. HARALAMBIE, supra note 84, §§ 9.02-9.03 (footnotes omitted). The PKPA is the first in-
stance in which Congress has assumed a role in the interstate conflict in recognizing out-of-
state child custody decrees. But the history of the legislation indicates that Congress intended
that child custody disputes remain in the state courts. P. HOFF, supra note 92, at 3. This
Comment deals only with the possibility of a foreign custody decree or of an initial United
States decree. Since the PKPA governs enforcement of custody decrees only between states of
the United States, it would not affect either of these two areas, except in the enforcement of an
initial decree in another state.
104, UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 3, 9 U.L.A. 122 (1979) (emphasis
added).
105. Id.
106. Id. § 3(a)(1)(i), 9 U.L.A. 122 (1979).
107. Id. § 3(a)(l)(ii), 9 U.L.A. 122 (1979).
108. Id. § 2(5), 9 U.L.A. 119 (1979).
109. Id. § 3(a)(2)(i) - (ii), 9 U.L.A. 122 (1979).
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light of the purposes of the whole UCCJA. 10 The Commissioners'
Comment to Section 6 states that Sections 6 and 7 further limit the
scope of Section 3 by providing that a court will not exercise jurisdic-
tion if it knows of another custody proceeding in another state, I "' or if
the UCCJA defines the state as an inconvenient forum.' 12 Therefore,
the UCCJA works to limit Section 3 while still allowing a state to
exercise jurisdiction if it is truly an appropriate forum.
The court may still have jurisdiction even in situations where the
state cannot exercise jurisdiction under either of the above subsec-
tions. The court has jurisdiction in an emergency situation, including
those in which the child has been abandoned,1 3 or threatened with
abuse 14 while present in the state. The state may also be entitled to
jurisdiction if no other state has jurisdiction under the preceding sub-
sections. If another state's court declares this state as the appropriate
forum,' 15 and "if it is in the best interest of the child that this court
assume jurisdiction," ' 1 6 then no other state has jurisdiction.
Section 3(b) states that the mere physical presence of the child
and/or one or more of the parents does not in itself suffice to establish
jurisdiction.1 17 On the other hand, the court can exercise jurisdiction
even without the child's presence in the state if the other requirements
of the preceding subsections are met.I11
Neither Section 3, nor any other section of the UCCJA, contains
any language referring to personal jurisdiction over the parties to the
custody dispute. The provisions of the UCCJA only concern subject
matter jurisdiction. 19 Since it is only the state's relationship to the
child which determines jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction over any
party to the suit is not one of the prerequisites. 120 Therefore, it ap-
pears that a court could have jurisdiction over a party simply because
of his or her connection to the child.
12 1
110. Id. at Commissioners' Comment to § 1, 9 U.L.A. 117 (1979).
111. Id. § 6(c) & Commissioners' Comment, 9 U.L.A. 134-35 (1979).
112. Id. § 7, 9 U.L.A. 137 (1979).
113. Id. § 3(a)(3)(i), 9 U.L.A. 122 (1979).
114. Id. § 3(a)(3)(ii), 9 U.L.A. 122 (1979).
115. Id. § 3(a)(4)(i), 9 U.L.A. 122 (1979).
116. Id. § 3(a)(4)(ii), 9 U.L.A. 122 (1979).
117. Id. § 3(b) - (c), 9 U.L.A. 122-23 (1979).
118. Id.
119. Marcus, supra note 93, § 5.02(1).
120. Id.
121. See A. HARALAMBIE, supra note 84, § 3.02.
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2. Section 15 (filing and enforcement of custody decree
of another state)
Section 15122 recognizes continuing jurisdiction. This section
provides that a second state shall enforce the custody decree of the
first state when either parent files the first state's decree with the sec-
ond state. 123 The UCCJA explicitly provides for the enforcement of
the decree because of the United States Supreme Court's reluctance to
extend application of the Full Faith and Credit Clause 124 of the
United States Constitution to child custody decrees. 125 The Commis-
sioners' Comment to this Section also makes it clear that "[t]he au-
thority to enforce an out-of-state decree does not include the power to
modify it.'1126 Otherwise Section 15 would defeat one of the main
purposes of the UCCJA, which is to stop the modification of custody
decrees when a state has little true connection to the case. Section 23
extends Section 15 to the enforcement of foreign country custody de-
crees. When combined with the requirements of Section 14 regarding
the modification of a decree, enforcement of a foreign country decree
is possible because Section 14 allows modification only where the orig-
inal court no longer has jurisdiction.
127
3. Section 14 (modification of custody decree of another state)
Section 14128 of the UCCJA attempts to severely limit the situa-
122. Section 15 of the U.C.C.J.A. reads:
(a) A certified copy of a custody decree of another state may be filed in the
office of the clerk of any [District Court, Family Court] of this State. The clerk shall
treat the decree in the same manner as a custody decree of the [District Court, Fam-
ily Court] of this State. A custody decree so filed has the same effect and shall be
enforced in like manner as a custody decree rendered by a court of this State.
(b) A person violating a custody decree of another state which makes it neces-
sary to enforce the decree in this State may be required to pay necessary travel and
other expenses, including attorneys' fees, incurred by the party entitled to the cus-
tody or his witnesses.
UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 15, 9 U.L.A. 158 (1979) (brackets in original).
123. Id. § 15 & Commissioners' Comment, 9 U.L.A. 158-59 (1979).
124. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
125. Marcus, supra note 93, § 5.01(2).
126. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT at Commissioners' Comment to § 15, 9
U.L.A. 158 (1979).
127. Id. at Commissioners' Comment to § 14, 9 U.L.A. 154-55 (1979).
128. Section 14 of the U.C.C.J.A. reads:
(a) If a court of another state has made a custody decree, a court of this State
shall not modify that decree unless (1) it appears to the court of this State that the
court which rendered the decree does not now have jurisdiction under jurisdictional
prerequisites substantially in accordance with this Act or has declined to assume
jurisdiction to modify the decree and (2) the court of this State has jurisdiction.
(b) If a court of this State is authorized under subsection (a) and section 8 to
426 [Vol. 9:413
International Child Custody
tions where one state can modify another state's custody decree. A
custody decree can be modified by another state only if the state that
issued the decree no longer has jurisdiction under Section 3 or if that
court has declined jurisdiction to modify its own decree. 129 The sec-
ond state's court must still have jurisdiction in its own right under
Section 3 before it can modify the decree.130
Section 14(b) then refers to Section 8, which instructs the court
that it "shall not" modify another court's decree if the person seeking
modification violated the original decree. 13' This section aims specifi-
cally at the problem of parental kidnapping. It states that if the per-
son seeking the modification stole the child from his or her appointed
custodian, the court may not exercise jurisdiction. 132 Coupling these
provisions with the preference for continuing jurisdiction 33 and for
home state jurisdiction, 134 the second court would have great diffi-
culty modifying the decree absent a true change in circumstances.
Finally, Section 14 provides that the modifying court must take
into account the record and findings of the first court. 35 This informs
the modifying court of all the circumstances as fully as possible before
making a decision.136 Therefore, any findings of another state or in-
ternational court could be considered.
4. Section 23 (international application)
Section 23137 specifically applies the UCCJA to international as
well as interstate custody disputes. It not only extends the general
modify a custody decree of another state it shall give due consideration to the tran-
script of the record and other documents of all previous procedings submitted to it in
accordance with section 22.
Id. § 14, 9 U.L.A. 153 (1979).
129. Id. § 14(a)(1), 9 U.L.A. 153-54 (1979).
130. Id. § 14(a)(2), 9 U.L.A. 154 (1979).
131. Id. § 8(b), 9 U.L.A. 154 (1979).
132. Id.
133. Id. § 14(a), 9 U.L.A. 153 (1979).
134. Id. § 3, 9 U.L.A. 122 (1979).
135. Id. § 14(b), 9 U.L.A. 154 (1979).
136. Id. at Commissioners' Comment to § 14, 9 U.L.A. 155 (1979). However, the weight
to be accorded to the records is still a matter of local law.
137. Section 23 of the U.C.C.J.A. reads:
The general policies of this Act extend to the international area. The provisions of
this Act relating to the recognition and enforcement of custody decrees of other
states apply to custody decrees and decrees involving legal institutions similar in na-
ture to custody institutions rendered by appropriate authorities of other nations if
reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard were given to all affected persons.
Id. § 23, 9 U.L.A. 167 (1979).
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policies of the UCCJA, 1 38 but also applies the recognition and en-
forcement provisions to international custody decrees where a court-
like institution has rendered a child custody decision.139 As the only
prerequisite, the section directs that all the parties have notice and the
opportunity to be heard. 140 The foreign country does not have to
comply with the jurisdictional requirements of Section 3 to qualify
under the UCCJA. It need only establish jurisdiction under its own
law. 14 1 However, if the foreign country does have jurisdiction under
Section 3, a court in the United States may have to decline jurisdic-
tion under the principles stated in Section 14.142 United States courts
have declined to modify decrees of foreign countries on that basis. 143
The Commissioners' Comment seems to dispose of any impres-
sion that the procedural or substantive custody law of the foreign
country must correspond to American law in any respect other than
the specified notice and hearing requirements. 144 Thus, very few lim-
its may exist for giving effect to a foreign country's decree, even when
that country has very different ideas of jurisdiction and radically dif-
ferent custody laws. 145 Most of the cases currently reported deal with
countries that have an English common-law heritage and where the
custody standard is the best interest of the child. 146 But the number
of cases coming from countries with different ideologies will likely
grow as the contact between those countries and the United States
increases. 1
47
Interpreting Section 23 in this way, an apparent conflict occurs
with Section 14 which allows continuing jurisdiction only for decrees
from those courts that took jurisdiction "under jurisdictional prereq-
uisites substantially in accordance with this Act."' 148 The Comment
to Section 14 does not include a definition of its similarity require-
138. Id. Most important in this regard is the policy against inter-jurisdictional disputes
and multiple litigation of the same dispute. Id. at Commissioners' Comment to § 23, 9 U.L.A.
167-68 (1979).
139. Id. § 23, 9 U.L.A. 167 (1979).
140. Id.
141. Id. at Commissioners' Comment to § 23, 9 U.L.A. 168 (1979); cf RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 10, 92, 98, 109(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1967).
142. A. HARALAMBIE, supra note 84, § 9.20.
143. Id.
144. R. CROUCH, supra note 88, at 40.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 14, 9 U.L.A. 153 (1979).
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ment. 149 In the Comment to Section 23, the Commissioners state that
they defer to the jurisdictional premises of other countries in accord-
ance with the general principles of international conflicts of laws.150
But the Commissioners do not state whether this section should be
interpreted with Section 14 or as a preemption of Section 14's require-
ments in the international arena. Therefore, it is difficult to ascertain
exactly what criteria the court will use in making this
determination. 51
B. Criteria Used for Determining Child Custody
Traditionally, at common law, the father had absolute power
over his offspring.' 52 Gradually this gave way to the notion that the
mother should have custody of her children during their "tender
years," commonly seven and under. 153 This "tender years" doctrine
prevailed in early twentieth century United States law. 154 Most state
courts now rule out the sex of the parent as the determinative fac-
tor. 15 Instead of leaning towards a gender-based presumption, the
courts now analyze each family's situation individually. 156 Today, al-
most every state court determines custody based upon the "best inter-
ests" of the child.15 7
The "best interests" analysis takes into account the family's en-
tire situation, 158 and therefore the trial court has a great deal of dis-
cretion in deciding which factors to examine in a custody case. The
way a court determines the detriments or best interests of a specific
child is highly individualized.159 Proponents of judicial discretion be-
lieve that this individualized standard allows judges to express chang-
149. R. CROUCH, supra note 88, at 40.
150. Id.
151. See Fernandez v. Rodriguez, 411 N.Y.S.2d 134, 97 Misc. 2d 353 (Monroe Cty. Sup.
Ct. 1978). "In Fernandez v. Rodriguez ... the court said that it did not have to honor a Puerto
Rican decree because Puerto Rico did not have jurisdictional statutes substantially similar to
the UCCJA .... Insufficient notice by the Puerto Rican Court was an additional reason for
refusal of comity." R. CROUCH, supra note 88, at 46.
152. A. HARALAMBIE, supra note 84, § 1.02 (e.g., Roman and English law).
153. Id. § 1.03.
154. Id. § 1.05.
155. Id. § 3.05.
156. Id. § 1.05.
157. Id. § 1.01.
158. Id. § 1.06.
159. Pearson & Luchesi Ring, Judicial Decision-Making in Contested Custody Cases, 21 J.
FAM. L. 703, 703-04 (1982-83).
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ing values within the society. 160 Others contend that this flexibility
necessarily involves a moral judgment by the judge, based upon his or
her own values and biases.16 1 Whatever the view, a best interests
analysis usually focuses on the needs of the child rather than the
rights of the parents.
162
A court considers a wide variety of individual factors in a best
interests analysis. Depending on the family's situation, one or more
factors may weigh more heavily in the particular analysis. Some of
these factors include the relationship between the parent, child and
siblings; the stability of the environment; the time a parent has avail-
able to spend with the child; abuse and neglect; religious training; a
move out of the state or out of the country; and the parents' and
child's wishes. 163 The court carefully analyzes any factor that touches
upon a parent's constitutional rights, such as freedom of religion. 
64
If religion were the controlling factor in a decision, the decision would
violate the parent's First Amendment rights. 165
Courts are also steadily becoming more sensitive to the child's
emotional needs as well as to the traditionally recognized physical
needs.' 66 As a result, courts have increased the emphasis on the psy-
chological parent-child relationship as opposed to the biological rela-
tionship. 167 Continuity of environment and of the primary caretaker
can dominate a suit where one parent has had temporary custody. 68
Courts have granted custody to a parent when a child has adjusted to
living with that parent and feels secure. 169 Even if this factor does not
appear in the final decision, the judge may have considered the disrup-
tion of the child's life potentially caused by awarding permanent cus-
tody to the parent who did not have temporary custody.170 Courts
have also expressed a preference for the primary caretaker, regardless
of gender. '
7
160. Id. at 704.
161. Id.
162. A. HARALAMBIE, supra note 84, § 1.06.
163. See Atkinson, Criteria for Deciding Child Custody in the Trial and Appellate Courts,
18 FAM. L.Q. 1 (1984).
164. Id.; see also A. HARALAMBIE, supra note 84, § 1.07.
165. Atkinson, supra note 163.
166. A. HARALAMBIE, supra note 84, § 1.06.
167. Pearson & Luchesi Ring, supra note 159, at 703.
168. A. HARALAMBIE, supra note 84, § 3.15.
169. In re Tuttle, 62 Or. App. 281, 660 P.2d 196 (1983).
170. Pearson & Luchesi Ring, supra note 159, at 720.
171. A. HARALAMBIE, supra note 84, § 3.08.
[Vol. 9:413
International Child Custody
The totality of the child's situation always determines the child's
best interests.7 2 Factors such as religion, education and medical care
may cause the most bitter disputes since the custodial parent has the
right to control these aspects of the child's upbringing absent a modi-
fication by the court. 173 Therefore, these controversial areas can be
crucial, if not controlling, in the presentation to the court. The fol-
lowing hypothetical child custody suit suggests how a court might
approach the difficult analysis involved when comparing Saudi Ara-
bia's custody law to that of the United States.
IV. DETERMINATION OF CUSTODY INVOLVING A CHILD OF A
FOREIGN PARENT
A. Hypothetical Suit (Based on a Real Life Situation)
At the age of twenty-two, "Lindy", a young woman from Ore-
gon, married a Saudi Arabian prince and moved with him to his coun-
try. 174 When she arrived, she found that she had to comply with the
traditional Islamic customs regarding women. 75 While there, she
and the prince had a son. 176 Lindy decided that she had to leave
Saudi Arabia because of the very confining customs. 177 Finally, the
prince helped her return to Oregon and divorced her.1 8 He let her
take their son with her. 179 No court in Saudi Arabia or in the United
States determined the permanent custody of the child. Consequently,
questions arise as to whether the prince can regain custody by ob-
172. Id. § 3.06.
173. Id. § 3.22.
174. La Jolla Light, supra note 68, at col. 1. "The prince had been sent to London to be
educated and was visiting friends in Oregon when he met the young American .... [He]
royally courted [Lindy] for a year while she was a college student in Oregon." Id. at cols. 2-3.
175. Although Arabian men may adopt Western customs while in the West, they return to
the Muslim way of life when they return to their own country. Id. at col. 3.
176. In September 1984, Lindy's son was four years old. Id. at col. 4.
177. The prince would come and go at will, but Lindy could leave her home only with a
male chaperone. Whenever a male visited, Lindy and all the women of the household had to
cover their faces and retreat to a back room. While she had many beautiful jewels and clothes,
she had no place to wear them except to visit other women in their homes. When the prince
left for weeks at a time, Lindy would ask where he had been. He always answered, "It is not
your place to ask." The home had grills on all the windows, and armed guards at the harem
gate.
Once, Lindy attempted to reach the United States Embassy by climbing over the harem
wall. But the morality police caught her and returned her to the prince's home. Id. at cols. I-
6.
178. Id. at col. 4.
179. Id.
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taining a judgment from either country, and whether he could enforce
a Saudi Arabian judgment in the United States.
B. Decree in a United States Court
If the foreign parent seeks a child custody decree in a United
States court, the court should commence a three-step evaluation.
First, the court should establish that it has subject matter jurisdiction
under the UCCJA. Secondly, the court should decide whether to use
the law of the foreign nation or of the state in which the parties bring
suit. Finally, the court should apply pertinent criteria under the cho-
sen law.
1. Jurisdiction under the UCCJA
Although the United States Constitution allows a foreign na-
tional to sue a United States citizen in federal court,1 80 federal courts
have held that state court is the proper forum for domestic relations
cases. 18 1 Therefore, a state court qualified under the UCCJA has ju-
risdiction even if the custody case involves a foreign national.
Under the UCCJA, the Oregon state court would have jurisdic-
tion over this model suit as Oregon is the child's home state. 18 2 Lindy
and her son have lived in Oregon since her divorce,18 3 thereby satisfy-
ing the jurisdictional requirement that the child must have lived in the
state where the court sits for six consecutive months before the pro-
ceeding. 18 4 As this model suit requires an initial decree, Sections 14
and 15 of the UCCJA concerning modification do not apply. Since a
foreign country decree is not involved, Section 23 covering interna-
tional application of the UCCJA does not apply either. As long as the
court determines that the out-of-country party has adequate notice
and an opportunity to be heard, 8 5 the Oregon state court has proper
jurisdiction.
2. Choice of law
After determining that a conflict exists between the laws of the
two countries involved in the suit, the hearing court must decide
180. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
181. 644 F.2d at 663.
182. U.C.C.J.A. § 3(a)(1).
183. La Jolla Light, supra note 68.
184. U.C.C.J.A. § 3.
185. Id. § 4.
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which jurisdiction's law to apply. As a state court properly hears
child custody matters, that state's choice of law principles shall ap-
ply. 186 If no state statute directs the choice of law, the court may look
at several factors to decide. 18 7 These factors may call for a result in
an international conflicts case that differs from an interstate
conflict. ' 88
One factor is the ease in determining and applying the foreign
law.' 8 9 Courts may avoid applying Islamic law in American courts
because of the difficulty in applying law based upon such a different
philosophy.190 A survey of contract and tort cases found that where
the plaintiff sought recovery and adjudication based on Islamic law,
simply pleading the Islamic law caused difficulty.) 91 An American
judge will most likely apply the familar American law because of his
uncertainty of the tenets and balancing principles inherent in Islamic
law. 192
Conversely, a judge could readily ascertain Islamic child custody
law. The mother is entitled to custody during the child's tender years,
and the father automatically gains custody after that. 193 This right
exists even without a court decree. 194 Islamic law, however, adjudi-
cates custody based upon the sex of the parent, not on evidence con-
cerning the best interests of the child presented in an unbiased
hearing. The applicable Islamic law therefore differs substantively
from American law and entitles the state court to adjudicate the cus-
tody issue independently. 195
Usually, a United States court will give effect to Islamic custody
law only where it serves the child's best interests by the standards of
186. Huynh Thi Ahn v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625, 630 (6th Cir. 1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6, 78, 289 (1971).
187. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2) (1971). The factors include:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant poli-
cies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and relative inter-
ests of those states in the determination of the particular issue, (d) the protection of
justified expectations, (e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law, (f)
certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and (g) ease in the determination
and application of the law to be applied.
Id.
188. Id. § 10.
189. Id. § 6 (2)(g).
190. See Forte, Islamic Law in American Courts, 7 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 1 (1983).
191. Id. at 31.
192. Id. at 32-33.
193. A. EHRENZWEIG & E. JAYME, 2 PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW § 326-2 (1973).
194. Id.
195. Id. § 331-4.
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the forum. 196 For example, the court in Abdul-Rahma Omar Adra v.
Clift 197 applied American law to a child custody suit although all of
the major parties retained citizenship from Islamic countries.
98
There, a Lebanese father sued his Iraqi ex-wife for custody of Najwa,
their daughter. 99 Both parents followed the Islamic faith. 2°° They
knew that Lebanese Islamic law governed custody of Najwa because
of her birth in Lebanon. 20' That law entitled the father to custody
when Najwa turned nine. 20 2 The mother brought Najwa to the
United States after the age of nine against the wishes of Najwa's fa-
ther.20 3 The father repeatedly tried to regain custody of Najwa after
she turned nine without success.20 4 Finally, he obtained a custody
decree from the Religious Court of Beirut, Lebanon, for Najwa's re-
turn.205 As Najwa and her mother lived in the United States, where
her mother had married a United States citizen, 20 6 the father brought
suit there.
The father filed suit in federal court, based upon 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350 which mandated federal court jurisdiction over an alien's ac-
tion in tort. 207 The suit did not attempt to enforce the Lebanese judg-
ment, but to gain a United States judgment to the same effect. The
court held that the mother had unlawfully retained custody of Najwa
and was liable under the statute.20 8 But the father did not ask for
money damages as his remedy. Instead, he asked for the return of
Najwa. 20 9 Thus, the court was forced to make a custody determina-
tion even though the suit was couched in terms of a tort. Although
the judge could have simply stated that an award of custody was not
an appropriate remedy under the statute, he instead proceeded to ana-
lyze the case as though it were a custody dispute.
The court recognized that Lebanese law entitled the father to
196. Id. § 326-2.
197. 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961).
198. Id. at 866.
199. Id. at 857.
200. Id. at 859.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 860.
203. Id. at 861-62.
204. Id. at 862.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 861.
207. Id. at 859.
208. Id. at 863.
209. Id.
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custody.210 However, although no state had yet enacted the UCCJA,
the court ruled that the state of the child's residence had a peculiar
interest in a child custody dispute .2 " Therefore, while a court should
accord Lebanese law consideration in making the final determination,
the best interests of the child dominated. 212 After weighing various
factors, the court concluded that it served Najwa's best interests to
remain with her mother.2 1 3 Although the mother still had liability in
tort, the court could not fashion the requested remedy in the face of
the best interests of the child. However, in reaching this decision, the
judge assumed that United States law was the proper law to apply.
He did not go through a choice of law analysis to support his conclu-
sion. It appears that the court used Najwa's mere presence in the
United States to apply United States law rather than Islamic law even
though Najwa still followed the Islamic faith and retained her Leba-
nese citizenship.
The application of United States law in this instance shows a pos-
sible cultural bias against Islamic law in United States courts. The
Adra court had ample information from which to ascertain the appli-
cable Islamic law. This availability of information negates the choice
of law argument that difficulty in finding and interpreting the foreign
law justifies application of United States law. If the judge does have a
cultural bias, he or she may not even be aware of it. Prejudice may
cause the judge to select certain facts over others for emphasis.214
These facts usually uphold any stereotypes the judge may already
hold of a certain group, causing unconscious prejudgment. 215 A cul-
tural bias may therefore involve prejudgment as well as misjudg-
ment. 216  "[R]esearchers have emphasized the cultural value
orientation that judges tend to share. Typically comprised of middle-
210. Id. at 860, 866.
211. Id. at 866.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 867.
214. G. SIMPSON & J. YINGER, RACIAL AND CULTURAL MINORITIES, AN ANALYSIS OF
PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION 21 (5th ed. 1985). In 1928, a "social distance" study was
devised by Bogardus. The study attempted to determine how close certain social groups felt to
others. He obtained responses from nearly 2,000 United States citizens to forty racial, na-
tional, and religious groups. This same study has been given to other groups of United States
citizens in 1931, 1933, 1946, 1956, and 1961. Over the years the results have changed very
little. White businessmen and schoolteachers classed the groups from most favorable to least
favorable, as follows: English, French, German, Spanish, Italian, Jewish, Greek, Mexican,
Chinese, Japanese, Negro, Hindu and Turkish. Id. at 95.
215. Id.
216. Id.
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age, middle-class males, the judiciary holds a value system that is re-
sistant to social change.121 7 Courts tend to prefer a more traditional
environment in custody considerations. 218 This preference probably
means that the traditional environment is a United States environ-
ment as opposed to an Islamic one. While all misjudgment does not
necessarily constitute a cultural bias,2 19 a child custody suit would
seem to demand that a judge carefully scrutinize his or her reasons for
applying United States law over Islamic law where no real reason
otherwise exists for considering the Islamic parent unsuitable for
custody.
In our model suit, the Oregon court has more reason to apply
domestic law rather than foreign law than did the Adra court. The
child here not only resides in the United States, he also has United
States citizenship. The court would not likely apply Saudi Arabian
law where, as here, it exhibits an inherent bias against one of the par-
ties. While the judge should try to quell any cultural bias he or she
may feel towards the Saudi legal system and the status of women, the
lack of legal consideration women are accorded in a custody dispute
would probably be determinative in the choice of law. Therefore, do-
mestic law should apply to this model suit for an initial decree.
3. Applying Oregon's child custody criteria
In the final stage of the custody analysis, the court applies the
forum state's law regarding which factors are considered important in
a custody dispute. Oregon determines child custody in terms of the
best interests of the child.220 The factors considered important in-
clude the child's emotional ties with family members, 221 the parties'
attitudes and interest in the child,222 and the merits of continuing an
existing relationship. 223 One factor should not be relied on to the ex-
clusion of any other,224 and the tender years doctrine is specifically
rejected. 225 These criteria appear very broad, but are limited by other
provisions. For example, the court only considers factors such as so-
217. Pearson & Luchesi Ring, supra note 159, at 706.
218. Schiller, Child Custody: Evaluation of Current Criteria, 26 DEPAUL L. REV. 241,
246 (1977).
219. G. SIMPSON & J. YINGER, supra note 214.
220. OR. REV. STAT. § 107.137(1) (1984).
221. Id. § 107.137(a).
222. Id. § 107.137(b).
223. Id. § 107.137(c).
224. Id. § 107.137(2).
225. Id. § 107.137(3).
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cial environment, life style, conduct and marital status when one
party can show that the child may suffer emotional or physical dam-
age if custody is granted to the other parent.226 However, where the
lifestyles of the two cultures involved differ so widely, as in our model
suit, cultural differences are bound to be considered.
The role played by religion in everyday life and in the legal sys-
tem constitutes the primary difference between the American and
Saudi cultures. The United States Supreme Court has held that the
First Amendment protects parents' interests in the religious training
of their child.227 But the establishment clause of the First Amend-
ment also prevents a court from showing a preference for one parent's
religion over that of the other parent. 228 This differs greatly from the
Saudi idea of religion as the foundation of everyday life. 229 This dif-
ference causes a significant dilemma in this type of case, where one
parent follows a religion that differs so greatly from the other parent.
The parties can compromise only with great difficulty. Where the
child suffers no real harm, a court cannot deny a parent custody be-
cause of unorthodox religious beliefs or because of an unusual reli-
gious lifestyle. 230 However, if the child exhibits a preference for a
certain form of religion, the court may consider which parent can best
satisfy the child's actual religious needs. 23' The child must be old
enough to understand the consequences of his or her religous decision
and must satisfy the court that the child bases the decision upon his or
her own preferences. 2
32
The court must also carefully eliminate any xenophobic bias
against the Islamic culture in making its decision. Just as race cannot
constitutionally be the sole determinative factor for custody,
233
neither should cultural background. But the court can examine the
difference in cultures when, as in this case, that difference would affect
the continuity of the child's environment. Granting custody to a for-
eign parent would not only cause loss of continuity, it would also
cause culture shock. Specifically, culture shock would greatly in-
crease if the court were to send the child to an Islamic country. The
226. Id. § 107.137(4).
227. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
228. A. HARALAMBIE, supra note 84, § 3.10.
229. Asherman, supra note 6, at 322-25.
230. A. HARALAMBIE, supra note 84, § 3.10.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Schiller, supra note 218, at 247; see Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
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degree of shock would also depend upon the child's sex. A girl would
face many new restrictions in the Islamic culture, while a boy may
find some advantages, especially if he comes from a prominent family.
Therefore, the court should consider both the cultural differences and
the sex of the child in making its determination.
Here, the degree of the child's assimilation into United States
culture compared with the degree of culture shock caused by moving
him to an Islamic culture would probably determine the suit. As long
as both parties exhibited an equal interest in the child and adequate
caretaking abilities, the Oregon court would most likely use this po-
tential trauma as the deciding factor. For example, if the United
States mother could not care for the child, the Saudi father's princely
status might make the case much closer. Furthermore, if the child
has lived in the United States for several years, the court most likely
will award custody to the mother to preserve the continuity of the
child's environment. Therefore, continuity of environment would
work towards the child's best interests.
C. Enforcement of a Foreign Custody Decree
The question then remains whether a previous foreign custody
decree would dictate a different result. The United States Senate has
given advice and consent to the Hague Convention on the Civil As-
pects of International Child Abduction and the Convention is cur-
rently in the House of Representatives awaiting enabling
legislation. 234 The Hague Convention sets out an international en-
forcement system for foreign custody decrees and for the return of
kidnapped children to their custodial parent. 235 But since Saudi Ara-
234. Telephone interview with Peter H. Pfund, Assistant Legal Adviser for Private Inter-
national Law, U.S. Department of State (Jan. 10, 1987).
235. The Convention establishes a system of administrative and legal procedures to
bring about the prompt return of children who are wrongfully removed to or retained
in a Contracting State. A removal or retention is wrongful within the meaning of the
Convention if it violates custody rights that are defined in an agreement or court
order, or that arise by operation of law, provided these rights are actually exercised
(Article 3), i.e., custody has not in effect been abandoned. The Convention applies to
abductions that occur both before and after issuance of custody decrees, as well as
abductions by a joint custodian (Article 3). Thus, a custody decree is not a prerequi-
site to invoking the Convention with a view to securing the child's return. By
promptly restoring the status quo ante, subject to express requirements and excep-
tions, the Convention seeks to deny the abductor legal advantage in the country to
which the child has been taken, as the courts of that country are under a treaty
obligation to return the child without conducting legal proceedings on the merits of
the underlying conflicting custody claims.
Schultz, Letter of Submittal, Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-11 at 3 (Nov. 5, 1985).
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bia did not attend the Convention, and shows no signs of adopting it,
it does not apply to our model suit.236 Therefore, the pre-Hague Con-
vention principles of comity for foreign decrees would apply.
The Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law states a general
policy that United States courts should recognize foreign judg-
ments, 237 although nothing in federal law compels a state to recognize
one.238 However, a treaty between the United States and the foreign
nation may compel a state to recognize a foreign judgment.239 Other-
wise, the states can decide for themselves whether to recognize a for-
eign judgment.24° Additionally, although the full faith and credit
clause of the United States Constitution 241 compels a state to recog-
nize another state's judgment, foreign judgments cannot claim this
same recognition. 242 Recognition of a foreign judgment is determined
exclusively by "comity.
' '243
"Comity" means that a court in a United States forum is not
subject to any higher authority that obliges it to apply foreign law.
244
236. "The Convention shall apply to any child who was habitually resident in a Con-
tracting State immediately before any breach of custody or access rights." S. Treaty Doc. No.
99-11, Article 4 at 7 (Nov. 5, 1985) (emphasis added). Although countries other than those in
attendance at the Hague Convention can become "Contracting States," it is highly unlikely
that Saudi Arabia will ratify the Convention. Saudi Arabia has not signed or ratified other
important United Nations Conventions concerning women and children (e.g., The Convention
for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persona and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of
others, the International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Chil-
dren, the Convention on the Political Rights of Women, and The Convention Concerning
Maternity Protection). N. HEVENER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE STATUS OF WOMEN
243-44 (1983).
237. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98 (1971). "A valid judgment
rendered in a foreign nation after a fair trial in a contested proceeding will be recognized in the
United States so far as the immediate parties and the underlying cause of action are con-
cerned." Id.; see also Swisher, Foreign Migratory Divorces: A Reappraisal, 21 J. FAM. L. 9, 15
(1982-83).
238. D. SIEGEL, CONFLICTS IN A NUTSHELL §§ 108-09 (1982).
239. Id. Although the United States and Saudi Arabia are parties to a Treaty, it does not
concern family law matters. In fact, the Treaty provides that citizens of the United States and
Saudi Arabia are subject to the laws of the country where they are presently situated. See
Provisional Agreement Between the United States ofAmerica and the Kingdom of Sa 'udi Arabia
in Regard to Diplomatic and Consular Representation, Juridicial Protection, Commerce, and.
Navigation, Nov. 7, 1933, 48 Stat. 1826.
240. D. SIEGEL, supra note 238, §§ 108-09. In fact, where there is no treaty or act of
Congress, a federal court may also have to follow the laws of the state in which it sits as to
recognition of foreign judgments under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98 comment e (1971).
241. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
242. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98 comment b (1971).
243. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 165 (1985).
244. Swisher, supra note 237, at 14 n.14.
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The seminal case on the definition of comity and its application is
Hilton v. Guyot.245 There, the United States Supreme Court defined
comity as:
neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of
mere courtesy and good will, upon the other, but it is recognition
which one nation allows within its territory to legislative, executive
or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to inter-
national duty and convenience and to the rights of its own citizens
or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.
246
The Court then explained that comity will not be extended unless a
court is:
satisfied that, where there has been opportunity for a full and fair
trial abroad before a court of competent jurisdiction, conducting
the trial upon regular proceedings, after due citation or voluntary
appearance of the defendant, and under a system of jurisprudence
likely to secure an impartial administration of justice between the
citizens of its own country and those of other countries, and there
is nothing to show either prejudice in the court or in the system of
laws under which it was sitting, or fraud in procuring the judgment,
or any other special reason.
247
Therefore, the foreign judgment must conform to the United States
forum's concepts of due process, fair notice, proper basis for jurisdic-
tion, and fair hearing.
248
If the foreign judgment fails in one of these areas, the state can
refuse to recognize the foreign judgment as contrary to its public pol-
icy 24 9 or as prejudicial to its interests.250 Courts have applied this
principle to another area of international family law, that of foreign
divorces.2 5 ' There, the courts have generally defined public policy as
the morality and public interests set out in a state's constitution, stat-
utes and judicial opinions. 252 Thus, a judicial opinion on whether to
extend comity to a foreign divorce would necessarily contain a public
policy discussion, including the possibility of prejudice to the parties,
to the forum state, or to its citizens.25 3 The overriding legal principle
245. 159 U.S. at 165.
246. Id. at 163-64.
247. Id. at 202-03 (emphasis added).
248. D. SIEGEL, supra note 238, § 109.
249. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 117 comment c (1971).
250. 159 U.S. at 165.
251. See Swisher, supra note 237, at 15.
252. Id. at 14 n.18.
253. Id. at 14.
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in any public policy discussion, however, allows the court to reject
recognition of any foreign judgment for a fundamental lack of fairness
to one or both parties.
254
Applying this principle to our model suit, the court should keep
in mind the fundamental bias against women in the Saudi Arabian
legal system.25 5 This bias, particularly in the area of child custody,
might well give a court in the United States the basis for indepen-
dently adjudicating the custody issue. Although the state's laws
might state a preference for recognition of foreign judgments, 256 a
Saudi court could not, by United States standards, accord a woman a
fair hearing even if she had proper notice and an opportunity to be
heard. The Saudi court would most likely render a conclusionary
judgment, based upon well-established Islamic law, that the father
should get custody. 257
Oregon's public policy is found in the state's adoption of the
UCCJA218 with its due process requirements and in the state's explicit
rejection of the tender years doctrine. 259 The rejection of the tender
years doctrine indicates that the state will not determine custody
based on sexual bias. Further, Section 109.720(3) of Oregon's
UCCJA requires that all parties must have had an opportunity to be
heard in the foreign action. 26° Therefore, as with an initial custody
decree, the Oregon court should not enforce a Saudi Arabian decree
and should reexamine the custody issue applying its own criteria.
V. PROPOSAL/CONCLUSION
In summary, the court should go through a two-step process in
evaluating an international child custody case. First, the court should
determine whether it has jurisdiction under the UCCJA to issue an
initial decree or to modify an existing decree. In making this determi-
nation, the court can examine where the child and the parents or
guardians reside261 or where the most information regarding the
254. Id.
255. See supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
256. In conformity with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98 (1971).
257. This Comment does not deal with Saudi Arabian jurisdictional law; it only deals with
the possible effect an existing Saudi judgment would have in a United States court.
258. OR. REV. STAT. § 109.700-109.930 (1984).
259. Id. § 107.137(3).
260. Id. § 109.720(3).
261. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT §§ 2(5), 3(a)(1)(i) - 3(a)(1)(ii), 9 U.L.A.
119, 122 (1979).
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child's care can be found.262 Here, the court could take jurisdiction
since it qualifies as the child's home state.
If a decree already exists, the court should determine if that de-
cree was issued under substantially the same laws as those of the
court's forum, 26 3 particularly with regard to notice and hearing re-
quirements. 264 If the laws differ substantially, so that all the parties
did not get a fair hearing, the court should take jurisdiction and ex-
amine the custody suit using the criteria of the applicable law. Here,
the Islamic law's inherent bias against women in a custody dispute
would justify a United States court's jurisdiction and an independent
evaluation of the merits of the case even where there was a previous
decree.
265
Secondly, the court should determine whether to apply foreign
custody law or United States custody law. If a state statute does not
dictate the choice of law, the court can apply factors as suggested by
the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, § 6(2). 266 In applying
these factors, the court should try to exclude any cultural bias from its
analysis. 267 Where, as in our model suit, the child is a United States
citizen and is present in the country, the application of United States
law appears certain. The child's substantial contacts with the forum
should justify application of the United States law.
Finally, the court should apply either the child custody criteria
of its forum, or of the foreign country, depending upon which law the
court has decided to apply. In applying United States law, the court
should carefully evaluate the differences between the two cultures in-
volved. But the court should use these differences only for analyzing
the affect on the continuity of the child's environment 268 and how the
child would cope with culture shock. The degree to which the child
has already assimilated into one culture compared with the degree of
culture shock can determine the suit if all other factors are equal.
Ideally, the court should award custody to that parent who can best
care for the child and to whom the child feels close. In our model
262. Id. §§ 3(a)(2)(i) - 3(a)(1)(ii), 9 U.L.A. 122 (1979).
263. Id. § 14, 9 U.L.A. 153 (1979).
264. Id. § 23, 9 U.L.A. 167 (1979).
265. See supra notes 234-59 and accompanying text.
266. See supra note 187.
267. See supra notes 214-18 and accompanying text.
268. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
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suit, the court should award custody to Lindy to preserve continuity
in her son's care and his cultural upbringing.
Janet A. W. Dray

